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COMMENTARY
A comment on privacy
David W. Stewart1
Published online: 20 October 2016
# Academy of Marketing Science 2016
Martin and Murphy (2017) provide a very useful and timely
review of the role of data privacy in marketing. They make
very clear the complexity of privacy as a construct and iden-
tify numerous rich opportunities for future research. An im-
portant theme of their paper is that privacy, and by implica-
tion, the loss of privacy, is difficult to define. The definitional
problem is reminiscent of Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart’s famous conclusion about the definition of pornog-
raphy: BI know it when I see it.^ The problem is that while
each individual may know it when they see it, there may not
be consensus or general agreement among individuals. So it is
with privacy. Individuals know it when they see it and have
clear perceptions about when they experience a loss of priva-
cy, but theymay differ in what they believe constitutes privacy
and what represents a loss of privacy. This is what makes
regulation, whether by a marketer or a government entity, so
difficult.
Martin andMurphy offer a very comprehensive and helpful
review of various approaches to the study of privacy. They
note that much of the research in marketing has focused on
privacy concern as a psychological construct and various
ways to measure the construct. Such research focuses on an
individual difference, privacy concern, rather than privacy it-
self. In contrast, they observe that research in information
technology has tended to focus on how information may be
misused. There is certainly a relationship between privacy and
the misuse of information, but information can be misused in
ways unrelated to privacy. Martin and Murphy also note that
still another stream of research on privacy has focused on
the characteristics of information or the perceptions of these
characteristics. Again, there are important relationships be-
tween information characteristics and privacy, but these
characteristics do not define privacy. Finally, there has been
work that has identified the types of harm that may arise
from breaches of privacy (see Solove 2010), but this work
also skirts past a definition of the construct itself.
Indeed, what constitutes privacy, or a loss of privacy, is
often determined as much by situational factors as by charac-
teristics of the individual or the information. What people say
they want in the way of privacy and how they actually behave
is often quite different, especially in social media. This seem-
ing inconsistency has been called the privacy paradox (Barnes
2006). This apparent inconsistency largely disappears when
situational factors are considered. People choose to share in-
formation on specific occasions, for specific purposes, and
with specific persons. These situational factors either explicitly
or, more often, implicitly bound expectations about how infor-
mation will and will not be used. Thus, someone may share
information in a particular social medium with the expectation
that the information will be available to only a limited circle of
family members or close friends for their personal use and for
only as long as the individual chooses to make the information
available.
Such situationally determined expectations play a role in
consumers’ responses to marketers use of information. For
example, when consumers are asked if they like to be on
marketers’ mailing or e-mailing lists they will often say
Byes^ when they perceive being on such lists as personally
relevant and beneficial. On the other hand, when consumers
state that they object to being on such lists they tend to cite
reasons related to the nuances of irrelevant communications
like junk mail and spam. In the former case, many consumers
willingly share information about themselves. In the latter
* David W. Stewart
david.stewart@lmu.edu
1 Department of Marketing and Business Law, College of Business
Administration, Loyola Marymount University, 1 LMU Drive, Los
Angeles, CA 90045, USA
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2017) 45:156–159
DOI 10.1007/s11747-016-0504-7
case, consumers wish to maintain their privacy by not sharing
information.
From a regulatory perspective a significant problem is that
neither the consumer nor the marketer may have complete
information about the relevant situational factors that define
expectations about privacy on the part of the consumer or the
ability of marketers to treat data in a particular fashion. From a
research perspective, a very fruitful avenue for future work
would be the development of a taxonomy of situational factors
that influence expectations about privacy and the willingness
of individuals to share or withhold information. For example,
one reason that consumer control has been found to be related
to greater consumer willingness to share information is be-
cause the consumer can customize what and how they share
information. This is the flip side of marketers’ ability to
personalize.
A strong starting point for the development of such a tax-
onomy is a working definition of privacy, and Martin and
Murphy review numerous definitions. However, many of the
constructs they identify are constructs related to privacy, such
as privacy concern, big data, and privacy failure, rather than
privacy itself, andMartin andMurphy do not offer a definitive
definition. Alternative definitions might suggest the same or
different situational factors. Therefore, alternative definitions
can be complementary and may be a particularly helpful strat-
egy for moving research forward. Nevertheless, the develop-
ment of any taxonomy must begin with a definition of the
phenomenon.
Defining privacy
Martin and Murphy observe that one of the earliest definitions
of privacy is attributable toWarren and Brandeis, who defined
privacy as being left alone. There is elegance in the simplicity
of this definition. Implied in this definition is the concept of
self or personhood. Being left alone indicates that there is a
boundary between a self, which is private, and the rest of the
world. At minimum, it suggests that there is a private self in
addition to a public face. Without an identified Bprivate self^
there is no meaningful construct of privacy. This does not
mean that there are no other transgressions related to informa-
tion, e.g., defamation, but these would not be invasions of
privacy. Privacy implies that there is a concealed or conceal-
able self that an individual may or may not reveal, in whole or
in part, to some others.
Defining privacy as being left alone also establishes an
initial state of equilibrium; personal information is available
only to the self. This is important for several reasons: (1)
privacy is defined in terms of an individual’s perception, being
left alone; (2) the decision to share information rests with the
individual; and (3) an invasion of privacy is a proactive act
(Binvasion^ is the operative word) by another party. Of course,
at the timeWarren and Brandeis offered their definition, in the
1890s, it was much easier to be left alone than it is today. An
individual, family, or small group could literally retreat from
society. A move of 90 miles or so might have been sufficient
to create a new context is which little or nothing was known
about an individual or that individual’s past by those with
whom he or she interacted. An individual in his or her home
was in a protected and private place. An invasion of privacy
was literally an invasion of which the individual would often,
if not always, be aware.
Technological innovations in transportation, including the
automobile and airplane, in communication, including tele-
phones and the Internet, and in information technology, in-
cluding data storage and data mining, to name only a few,
have made it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to
protect their privacy by withdrawal or to erase the past by
making a short move. Paradoxically, the use of some of the
means once used to protect privacy now require that individ-
uals give up privacy. Moving to a remote location, if one can
be found, requires travel, which may require a driver’s license,
a car registration, an airplane ticket, a security check, or some
other requirement to provide identifying information.
Technological innovation, which is generally good for so-
ciety, has increasingly placed the burden of protecting privacy
on individuals, even as there are more demands for greater
sharing of information as a condition of being a consumer
and member of society. As the number of ways in which
potential invasion of privacy can occur has grown, there has
been a shift of emphasis from prohibiting and preventing in-
vasion, where the majority of costs are imposed on the invad-
er, to proactive protection, where the greater burden is placed
on the invaded. This represents a critical dimension for the
definition of privacy and any taxonomy of the factors that
contribute to it and its loss.
It also suggests that the economic dimensions of privacy
are complex. The burden of proactive protection includes
more than financial costs. There are also cognitive, temporal,
and emotional costs. Individuals are inundated with complex
and idiosyncratic privacy policies that an individual may or
may not agree with and may or may not accept, even if they
agree. Time and effort spent processing such policies, if atten-
tion is even paid to them, is a cost. Notices of breaches of
privacy are increasingly common and indiscriminate with re-
spect to the seriousness of the breach. A result of placing the
burden of defending personal privacy on the individual is
desensitization; individuals become less concerned about the
loss of privacy and less able to discriminate between serious
breaches of privacy and minor, unintentional transgressions.
Such desensitization erodes both the concept of privacy and
the sense of self. It also creates greater opportunity for unscru-
pulous operators who can exploit the inattention and desensi-
tization. Martin and Murphy raise a related point in their dis-
cussion of the economics of privacy where they discuss work
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2017) 45:156–159 157
on the erosion of markets for privacy. However, the work they
discuss makes various assumptions about how such markets
might be structured. A taxonomy of situational determinants
of privacy has the potential to reveal structural alternatives for
privacy markets that could be explored in greater detail.
The role of government
Among the important structural determinants of any market
for privacy are government and government regulation.
Martin and Murphy cast the role of government as that of
benevolent and benign protector of consumer privacy. It is
certainly the case that government does seek to provide some
protection of consumer privacy, but it also the case that gov-
ernment has sought to coerce marketers into revealing private
information. Government often makes information public in
the interests of public interest when it is not always clear that
there is any legitimate public interest. In addition, there is a
long tradition of privacy defined as protection from govern-
ment (Levin and Nicholson 2005).
Government is neither benevolent nor benign. Some of the
largest breaches of privacy have been by government.
Government has created many identifiers and identifying pro-
cesses that serve as links between the private self and the
external world. Having created a plethora of identifiers and
identification process, the government and others admonish
individuals to keep such information private or at least man-
age it with care. No treatment of privacy will be complete
without explicit recognition of the role of government.
Evaluation of alternative privacy policies among marketers
needs to be placed in the context of both what government
regulation permits and prohibits and the government’s own
privacy policies and management of information.
It is naïve assume the government is and should be the
protector of privacy. Martin and Murphy briefly review re-
search that demonstrates that third party gatekeepers often
work to the detriment of consumers. It is certainly the case
that the generally slow response of government to technolog-
ical innovation means that regulation, especially regulation
related to information technology, is dated and incomplete.
Similarly, the fragmented nature of government often creates
inconsistent policies and unintended consequences. For exam-
ple, there is evidence that the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) has had a detrimental impact on
medical research even when there is no need for personally
identifying information as a part of the research (Gomes
2009). Finally, government control of access to private infor-
mation creates opportunities for the same abuses that are
found in other organizations but on a much wider scale, in-
volving the potential for far greater economic and social
consequences.
The government’s own problems with privacy and the
well-publicized stories about breaches of government data,
illegal surveillance, and misuse of personal data have pro-
duced greater awareness of the value of privacy to at least
some consumers and created incentives for marketers to offer
greater privacy and information security to consumers. Thus,
new market solutions may develop. The development of such
solutions might also be facilitated by a taxonomy of situation-
al determinants of privacy.
Toward a contextual framework of privacy
One conclusion that can be drawn from the Martin and
Murphy paper is that there has been rather little research that
focuses on privacy as a construct. Rather, the considerable
research on privacy that has been published has focused on
the relationship of privacy to other things: how important it is
(whatever Bit^ is), how it might be lost, and the consequences
of losing privacy. All are important topics, but they leave the
construct poorly defined. Much of the research to date has
focused on the loss of privacy. Much of the regulatory work
among both marketers and government organizations has fo-
cused on how to prevent unwanted loss of privacy. Missing
from much of this research is an effort to address the question
of why privacy is important. Is privacy itself important, or is it
only the consequence of losing privacy with associated nega-
tive consequences that matter?
If privacy is defined as Bbeing left alone^ it would be useful
to explore the positive benefits of this state. Are these benefits
associated with manifestation and/or maintenance of a sense
of self, e.g., being alone with one’s thoughts, collecting one-
self, meditation? Are there situations in which such benefits
are especially important? The European approach to privacy,
with its focus on protection of individual dignity and public
image, seems to embrace such positive benefits of privacy
(Levin and Nicholson 2005).
It is important to separate such positive benefits and the
loss of these benefits from harm that may arise from the loss
of privacy that results from misuse of information and the
negative consequences of such misuse. The economic conse-
quences of identity theft are quite different from a loss of the
sense of self, though both consequences may be costly.
After clearly differentiating the positive consequences of
privacy from the potential negative consequences of the loss
of privacy it is possible to ask about the circumstances in
which an individual would give up some amount of privacy.
Such a trade-off will likely be situationally determined.
Development of such a taxonomy would be a significant con-
tribution to theory, management practice, and public policy.
Such a taxonomy is beyond the scope of this comment, but
some of the general dimensions are clear: (1) What is the
benefit of giving up information? (2) To whom will the
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information be revealed? (3) At what level of detail? (4) For
what purpose? (5) For what period of time? (6) How sensitive
or personal is the information? (7) Is secondary use of the
information expected or permitted? (8) What secondary uses
of the information are possible? (9) What are the potential
consequences of potential secondary uses? This is not an ex-
haustive list but suggests the general dimensions of a
taxonomy.
Such a situational or contextual taxonomy suggests the
need for a contingency theory of privacy. A contingency the-
ory of privacy carries with it several implications. First, since
only the individual providing information knows what uses of
shared information are acceptable to him or her, the default for
the decision to share should involve and opt-in. Second, the
decision to opt-in needs to be informed by the relevant con-
textual factors that influence the decision to share information.
The relevant information in disclosures about privacy and the
use of shared information should include the relevant contin-
gencies. Third, because contingencies can change over time
individuals who opt to share information should have the abil-
ity to reverse this decision, as well as the ability to erase
previously shared information to the extent possible. This per-
spective is far more consistent with the European view of
privacy than the view in the United States (Directorate
General for Internal Policies 2015). To the degree that this is
the case, the European view has greater conceptual consisten-
cy, though logical consistency has never been a prerequisite
for public policy.
Martin and Murphy have provided a rich source of ideas for
future research by summarizing much of the extant research on
privacy. Their summary offers a helpful organization of a very
fuzzy literature. This commentary complements the summary by
offering some thoughts about the definition of privacy as a
unique construct, by differentiating research on privacy from
research on factors related to privacy and its loss. Finally, this
commentary suggests that the most relevant research questions
are related to when and under what circumstances individuals
willingly give up some privacy for some benefit. Such trade-offs
are situationally determined. A taxonomy of situational dimen-
sions that influence these trade-offs and a contingency theory of
privacy would be a useful direction for future research.
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